This article describes a simple model of market microstructure which explains a concave price impact. In the proposed model, the local relationship between the order flow and the fundamental price (i.e. the local price impact) is linear, which makes the model dynamically consistent. Nevertheless, the expected impact on midprice from a large sequence of co-directional trades is nonlinear and asymptotically concave. The main practical conclusion of the model is that, throughout a meta-order, the volumes at the best bid and ask prices change (on average) in favor of the executor. This conclusion, in turn, relies on two more concrete predictions of the model, one of which is tested using publicly available market data without the information about meta-orders.
remainder of this section, the main results of this paper can be stated in plain language, without appealing to any sophisticated technical arguments. These results are, nevertheless, proven rigorously in Section 2 (and this is where the technical arguments are needed). The model allows for multiple market participants, consuming and providing liquidity, which makes it well suited for order-driven markets. The setting of the model is "bottomup": i.e., its inputs have clear economic meaning and can be measured from market data. The proposed explanation does not require the predictability of future prices or oder flow and, hence, is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Finally, a significant advantage of the proposed explanation is that one of its two most important predictions (which directly imply the concavity of price impact) can be tested on real market data without the information about meta-orders (as the latter is notoriously difficult to obtain).
The remainder of this section is devoted to the description of the main results of the paper. Their precise statements and mathematical proofs are given in Section 2, and their numerical and empirical analysis is presented in Section 3. We measure all prices in ticks and assume that the asset under consideration has constant spread of size one (see the end of Section 3.2 for the discussion of this assumption). We also assume the existence a real-valued process X, which we refer to as the fundamental price, and which has the meaning of a signal predicting the direction of the next trade. Namely, X is always between the best bid and the best ask prices, and the closer it is to the bid (ask) the more likely it is that the next trade will be a sell (buy). 3 It is clear that the best bid and the best ask prices are given by the roundings X and X , respectively, and that they change whenever X hits an integer. We also assume that every trade makes a linear local impact 4 on X, with the coefficient α. For example, a buy trade of size δ changes X to X + αδ. Assuming that, between trades, X follows a symmetric random walk, we conclude that its global dynamics must have a force, or a drift term, that pushes X away from the midprice. Indeed, if X is slightly above the midprice, the next trade is more likely to be a buy, which pushes X further up and makes the next buy even more likely, and so on. 5 Section 2.2 gives the precise form of this drift and of the dynamics of X. For simplicity, let us focus on the dynamics of X between two nearest integers -i.e., we consider X mod 1 (X modulo one). As explained above, the process X mod 1 is a random walk (on the unit circle) with a drift that pushes it away from 1/2. The stationary distribution of such a process 6 must have a U-shaped density (see the top left part of Figure 1 ). Thus, before the execution of a meta-order begins, the distribution of the fundamental price modulo one has a U-shaped density. Next, let us analyze what happens toward the end of a meta-order. It is natural to assume that a meta-order, which is a sequence of co-directed trades, introduces an additional drift term in X mod 1, of the same sign as the meta-order itself (see equation (13) for the dynamics of the fundamental price during a meta-order). If this additional (constant sign) drift is very large, it is easy to deduce that the stationary distribution of the resulting process is uniform (think, e.g., of a Brownian motion with a very large drift, run on a circle). It is clear that the wings (i.e., the values at 0 and 1) of a U-shaped density are higher than the wings of a uniform density (the latter are equal to one). Interpolating heuristically between zero additional drift and the infinitely large drift, we conclude that the wings of the stationary density of X mod 1 before a sufficiently long meta-order are higher than the wings of its density at the end of this meta-order, for any positive execution rate (compare the top left and the bottom right parts of Figure 1 ). This heuristic interpolation is made rigorous in Proposition 5, under additional modeling assumptions. Now, the phenomenon of "improving liquidity" becomes clear. Interpreting X as the microprice (see [19] ), one easily sees that the lower wings of the stationary density of X mod 1 imply throughout the paper. However, the numerical experiments reveal that, for a wide range of parameters' values, the model produces globally concave price impact curves. smaller probability of observing low liquidity (i.e., low volume of limit orders) at the best bid or ask. 7 It only remains to connect the wings of the stationary density of X mod 1 to the price impact directly. To this end, notice that the expected impact on the midprice of a buy trade of size δ, submitted at time t = 0, is given by
where X 0 mod 1 is a random variable whose density is given by the stationary density of X mod 1. For δ ↓ 0, it is clear that the leading order of the above expectation is given by the probability that X 0 + αδ > 1. The latter, in turn, is proportional to the wings of the stationary density of X mod 1. Thus, the expected marginal impact on the midprice is proportional to the wings of the stationary distribution of the fundamental price modulo one. Proposition 3 makes this statement rigorous. As mentioned above, a meta-order introduces an additional drift term in the dynamics of the fundamental price, thus, switching the market into a different regime. In this new regime, X mod 1 attains a new stationary density (provided the meta-order lasts long enough), whose wings are lower than the wings of the original stationary density. Repeating the above argument that connects the wings of the stationary density and the marginal impact (see Proposition 4), we conclude that the marginal impact at the end of the meta-order is lower than at the beginning (see Theorem 1), which implies the (asymptotic) concavity of price impact.
Note that the explanation of concave price impact presented above relies only on two predictions. The first one is the U-shape of the (global) stationary distribution of the fundamental price modulo one. The second prediction is that, during a meta-order, the fundamental price obtains an additional drift term of constant sign. While it is impossible to test the second prediction without the meta-order data (although this prediction appears to be self-evident), the first prediction is verified using real market data in Section 3.2.
Mathematical analysis of the model
The roots of the proposed model go back to the game-theoretic setting of [10, 9, 11] . However, the specific model proposed herein is natural enough and does not require any additional justification via equilibrium arguments. The core of the model is the assumption that the potential buyers and sellers arrive to the market one by one, having their own reservation prices (i.e., the "fair" prices for the asset, in their view). If a reservation price of an agent is above (below) the current best ask (bid) price, a sell (buy) trade occurs. The reservation prices are not independent across the potential buyers and sellers: they have a common component X and the idiosyncratic additive part, generated from a (symmetric around zero) distribution with c.d.f. F . It is shown in [11] that, for reasonable values of the model parameters, the agents providing liquidity via limit orders set the equilibrium bid and ask prices exactly at X and X , respectively, thus, making the model consistent with the setting described in Section 1. The details of the model are presented in the remainder of this section, with the main result (the asymptotic concavity of price impact) stated in Theorem 1. It is worth mentioning that a part of this section contains the description of two models: with finite and infinite trading activity. The former is easier to interpret from the economic (or practical) point of view. The latter provides more tractable expressions for the target quantities. We show that the two are consistent and, ultimately, focus our attention on the infinite activity model.
Finite activity jump-diffusion model
Potential buyers/sellers arrive according to a Poisson process with jump times {S i } and intensity λ. The reservation price of the ith buyer/seller is
where {ξ i } are i.i.d. random variables, with c.d.f. F , andX evolves according tõ
withB being a Brownian motion independent of {S i , ξ i }, and with
Throughout the rest of the paper, we make the following standing assumptions on F and σ.
• F ∈ C 1+ ([−1, 1]), for some ∈ (0, 1), and F is symmetric around x = 0 in this range.
• σ has period one and is symmetric around x = 1/2.
Denote by M a Poisson random measure with the compensator
independent ofB. Then, the fundamental price and the order flow are described by the following system:
where
Note that
The input to the model is (α, σ, F, λ, δ).
Infinite activity diffusion model
For analytic tractability, it is convenient to consider an infinite-activity limit of the model (1), as λ → ∞. In order to avoid the explosion of total order flow, we need to assume that δ → 0, so that λδ → γ, with some constant γ > 0. For simplicity, we assume that δ = γ/λ. Notice that
where Z is a martingale. Then,
Thus, we expectX to converge to X which is the solution of
equipped with the same initial condition asX. We do not make this statement precise, as we will in fact need the convergence of time-changed processes, established in Lemma 1. At this stage it is only important to notice that the drift of X in (2) is positive in (n, n + 1/2), and is negative in (n + 1/2, n + 1), for any integer n.
Hence, this drift pushes X away from the midprice.
Expected impact on midprice by a VWAP strategy 2.3.1 Finite activity model
Recall that the process (N t = N + t − N − t ) represents the total order flow in the market. In the finite activity model (1), we haveX
whereB is a Brownian motion and M is an independent Poisson random measure with the compensator
The total order flow is a sum of the order flows of K individual market participants (agents):
We assume that the agents follow VWAP-type strategies (this terminology is explained below). Namely, the jth agent has the order flow
where {M j } are independent Poisson random measures with the compensators
• {ζ j (·, u)} are independent across j = 1, . . . , K, across u ≥ 0, and independent of ({M j },B),
• for each j = 1, . . . , K and (x, u) ∈ R × R + , we have
.
The random fields {ζ j } represent the heterogeneity of agents in terms of their trading styles. For example, at any given moment in time, one agent may buy (i.e., ζ j = 1), while another one may sell (i.e., ζ j = −1). In general, we allow the agents' trading styles to depend on the fundamental price and on their idiosyncratic sources of randomness. The assumptions we make on {ζ j } are not the most general, but they ensure that the model is consistent: i.e., the total order flow N = K j=1 N j satisfies (4), with the Poisson random measure M = K j=1 ζ j M j , having the prescribed compensator. The latter observation follows easily by conditioning onB and applying the standard results on thinning and superposition of compound Poisson processes.
To see why we call the agents' strategies VWAP-type, recall that VWAP is an execution strategy that prescribes to trade at the rate that is a fixed fraction of the total traded volume rate in the market. This strategy is very popular among practitioners and has been studied extensively in academic literature (see, e.g., [13] ). Notice that, in the present model, the total traded volume in the market at time t is given bỹ
Comparing the above with (6), we conclude that the jth agent in the proposed model trades with the rate that is λ j /λ fraction of the overall rate, which makes it similar to VWAP. However, unlike the classical VWAP strategy, where the trades are made in the same direction, our agents trade in different directions.
Let us now assume that the first agent aims to compute the expected impact of a sequence of her buy trades (referred to as the execution interval) on the midprice. 8 Recalling (6), we conclude that any such execution interval can be characterized by the condition ζ 1 = 1. In order to compute this expected impact in practice, the agent (i) finds the past execution intervals in a sample of past L trades, (ii) records the changes in the quoted ask price over each interval, and (iii) computes the sample average of these changes. Mathematically, this process corresponds to computing
where the constants Q ≥ 0 and L > 0 denote, respectively, the (fixed) total amount of the asset purchased by the first agent over each randomly selected execution interval and the size of the sample (measured in trades of the first agent) from which the execution intervals are selected. The random times τ 0 and τ 1 denote, respectively, the start and end times of a randomly chosen execution interval:
, η ∼ U (0, L), 8 We only consider the execution intervals of buy trades, as the case of sell trades is analogous.
where we choose a right-continuous inverse function and assume that η is independent of everything else. The above choice of τ 0 corresponds to the assumption that each trade of the agent is equally likely to be the first trade of an execution interval.
It is easy to see that the conditional distribution of (
whereW is a Brownian motion,M andM are Poisson random measures with the compensators
and all are mutually independent and independent of (X, N 1 , η). Thus, the expected impact on midprice (of a VWAP buy interval) can be rewritten as
where (X,Ṽ ) are defined in (3), (5), (6), (7) , and (Ỹ x ,Ñ x ) are defined in (8), (9) . The processÑ represents the order flow of the first agent during her (buy) execution intervals. The interpretation ofỸ is also clear: it is a model for the fundamental price during the (buy) execution intervals of the first agent. Since the order flow is biased upwards in such intervals, the integrand in (8) has a sum of two (mutually exclusive) indicators, and the resulting nondecreasing processÑ creates an upward trend in the dynamics of Y .
Infinite activity model
Note that the expected impact on midprice, given by (10) , depends only on the distributions ofX andȲ , defined in (10) . Let us fix γ > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1], and consider the limit of the expected impact:
provided it is well defined. The restriction δ = γ/λ is discussed at the beginning of Subsection 2.2. The condition λ 1 = θλ is equivalent to the assumption that the market participation rate of the first agent is fixed as we vary λ. It turns out thatX converges (weakly) toX, given bŷ
with a Brownian motionB and witĥ
,σ(θ, y) := σ(y) θγ(F (−β + (y)) + F (β − (y))) , whileȲ x converges (weakly) toŶ x , given bŷ
with a Brownian motionŴ and witĥ
To make the above statement precise, we viewX,Ȳ x as random elements with values in the Skorokhod space D([0, ∞)), andX,Ŷ x as random elements with values in C([0, ∞)). Note also that the laws of the processesX andŶ x are uniquely determined by (12) and (13), which can be easily seen by applying the scale function transformation and reducing these SDEs to the ones with no drifts and with Lipschitz diffusion coefficients.
Lemma 1. As λ → ∞, for any x ∈ R, we have:
where the convergence is in weak topology induced by the C([0, ∞))-seminorms.
Proof:
W.l.o.g., we only prove the convergence ofX. Recall that the latter is a composition of two processes,X andṼ 1 . First, we prove the C-tightness of the joint law of (X,Ṽ 1 ) over λ → ∞ on a finite time interval [0, T ]. To prove the latter, it suffices to show (i) that the absolute values of the two processes are bounded in probability, uniformly over λ, and (ii) that 
where C is a constant and we recall λ 1 = θλ and δ = γ/λ. Next, we consider any limit point Λ (a probability measure on (C([0, T ])) 2 ) of the family {P•(X,Ṽ 1 ) −1 } λ , with the associated sequence {λ n → ∞}. In particular, (X n ,Ṽ 1,n ) → (X,V 1 ) in weak topology induced by the C-norm. Let us describe the dynamics of (X,V 1 ). It is easy to see that, for any
Choosing an approproiate sequence of f approximating the identity, we deduce from the above thať
Similarly, for any
From the above, we deduce that the process 2 , is a continuous martingale under Λ and, therefore, is given by a Brownian integral. Using the test function, as in the above, we easily deduce that d < M > t = σ 2 (X t )dt a.s. under Λ. Thus we have shown thatX can be written aš
whereB is a Brownian motion under Λ. As the law of (X,V 1 ) is uniquely determined by (14) and (15), the convergence of (X n ,Ṽ 1,n ) holds along any sequence {λ n → ∞}.
To conclude the proof, we notice that there exists ε > 0, s.t., Λ-a.s.,
. Thus, using the Skorokhod's representation theorem and the portmanteau theorem, we conclude that, along any {λ n → ∞},
· ) −1 =:X, with the convergence being in weak topology induced by the C-norm. Using (14) and (15), we easily show that X satisfies (12) . Recalling that the solution to (12) is unique in law, we complete the proof of the lemma. Remark 1. It is easy to see from the proof of Lemma 1 that, in the infinite activity model, during an execution interval of the first agent, her order flow is given by
where Y represents the dynamics of the fundamental price in such intervals (it is the limit ofỸ ). In addition, the total traded volume in the market is given by
Thus, in the infinite activity limit, the first agent still uses a VWAP strategy, with the participation rate θ.
In view of Lemma 1, it is natural to expect that I L (Q, γ, θ), given by (11) , can be computed by replacing (X,Ȳ ) by (X,Ŷ ) in (10). Proposition 1. For any L > 0, Q ≥ 0, and θ ∈ (0, 1], the limit in (11) is well defined, and we have
with η ∼ U (0, L) independent of (X,Ŷ ).
The proof follows from Lemma 1, the portmanteau theorem, and the fact that neitherŶX η Q norX η have atoms.
In the remainder of the paper, we stay in the setting of the infinite activity model.
Large-sample limit
Recall that η ∼ U (0, L), where L represents the length of the data sample from which the execution intervals are collected. 9 As it is natural to estimate impact over a large sample, we consider L → ∞ and set
provided the limit is well defined. Not surprisingly, the large-sample expected impact on midprice turns out to be connected to the stationary distribution of the fundamental price. We begin with the following technical result.
Lemma 2. Let us fix an arbitrary θ > 0. Then, there exist unique stationary distributions ofX mod 1 and Y mod 1, with the densities ψ and χ, respectively. These densities are uniquely determined by the following conditions:σ
Moreover, for any bounded Borel-measurable function G, we have, for any x ∈ R,
Proof: W.l.o.g. we only consider the case ofX mod 1. First, we notice that the assumptions on F and σ imply thatμ i (θ, ·)/σ 2 (θ, ·) ∈ C 1+ ([0, 1]), for i = 0, 1. Then, for any c > 0, Theorem 6.5.3 in [14] yields the existence and uniqueness ofσ 2 ψ ∈ C 2+ ([0, 1]) satisfying the ODE in (19) with the boundary conditionŝ σ 2 (θ, 0 + )ψ(0 + ) =σ 2 (θ, 1 − )ψ(1 − ) = c. Moreover, the maximum principle (or the Feynman-Kac formula) implies that ψ > 0. Hence, choosing c > 0 appropriately, we can ensure that 1 0 ψ(x) = 1. Thus, we have shown the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (19) .
By choosing an arbitrary f ∈ C 2 ([0, 1]), satisfying f (0) = f (1) = 0 and f (0 + ) = f (1 − ), applying Itô's formula to f • (· mod 1)(X), integrating by parts, and using (σ 2 ψ)(0 + ) = (σ 2 ψ)(1 − ), along with the ODE (19) and the dominated convergence, we show that
whereX x is the solution to (12) with X 0 = x. As follows from Theorem 5.4.20 and Remark 5.4.21 in [12] , {X x } x∈R is a Markov family with the transition denoted by K(x, A). Due to periodicity of the coefficients in (12), we have K(x + n, A + n) = K(x, A). Then, it is easy to see that {X x mod 1} x∈[0,1) is a Markov family with the transition kernel ∞ n=−∞ K(x, A + n). The Markov property and (21) imply that ψ is stationary. To show uniqueness of the stationary distribution ofX mod 1, consider any such distribution and use the scale function transformation, along with the continuous differentiability and Gaussian estimates for the fundamental solution of a linear (strictly) parabolic PDE with Lipschitz coefficients (see, e.g., [7] ), to conclude that the stationary distribution has density ψ ∈ C 1 ([0, 1]), s.t. ψ(0) = ψ(1). Using Itô's formula, we show that ψ is a weak solution to the ODE in (19) on (0, 1), with the test functions in C 2 0 ((0, 1)). Using the weak form of the ODE (19) , we improve the regularity and conclude thatσ 2 (θ, ·)ψ ∈ C 2+ ((0, 1)), and, in turn, that the ODE (19) holds in classical sense. Thus, the first part of the proof yields uniqueness of the stationary distribution.
Finally, to obtain the last statement of the lemma, it is a standard exercise to check that the families of measures
parameterized by T ≥ 0, are tight and that each of their limit points (in weak topology), as T → ∞, is a stationary distribution ofX mod 1. Since such distribution is unique, we obtain the statement of the lemma for bounded continuous G. As the stationary distribution has no atoms, this statement is extended to all bounded Borel-measurable G.
Proposition 2. For any Q ≥ 0 and θ > 0, the limit in (18) is well defined, and we have:
where ψ is the density of the stationary distribution ofX mod 1.
Proof:
Notice that, for any x ∈ R and any integer n,Ŷ x+n =Ŷ x . Then, using the independence ofX,Ŷ and η, and the uniform distribution of η, we have:
Using the ergodicity of X mod 1 (see Lemma 2) ,
Marginal expected impact
First, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of ∂ Q I(Q, θ) as Q ↓ 0. Since the drift and volatility ofŶ x are bounded and continuous and the volatility is bounded away from zero, as Q → 0, we have, uniformly over x ∈ [0, 1]:
where Φ is the standard normal c.d.f.. Then, using the continuity of ψ, the conditions ψ(0 + ) = ψ(1 − ) and σ(θ, x) =σ(θ, 1 − x), for x ∈ (0, 1), as well as the mean value theorem and the dominated convergence, we obtain, as Q → 0:
Thus, we have proved the following proposition. Similarly, we can analyze ∂ Q I(Q, θ) as Q → ∞. Notice that, due to the Markov property ofŶ (see analogous argument for the Markov property ofX in the proof of Lemma 2) and the periodicity of the coefficients in (13), we have:
where R x ∼Ŷ x mod 1 and Z ∼ RX η Q mod 1 are independent of (X,Ŷ ). Repeating the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain
Applying the scale transformation toŶ x , to eliminate the drift, it is easy to see that the density ofŶ x t , denotedχ x t , can be written asχ
where Γ(·, x, ·) ∈ C 1+ε,1+ε , with some ε ∈ (0, 1), is the fundamental solution of the parabolic PDE associated with the transformedŶ x , and P is an exponentially bounded Lipschitz-continuous function whose derivative is continuous everywhere except integers, where it has first order discontinuities. A direct computation shows that
where the equation holds globally in (t, y) ∈ (0, ∞) × R in a weak sense and pointwise (with all derivatives being well defined) everywhere except (0, ∞) × Z, with the left and the right limits being well defined at every integer y. Then, applying the Gaussian estimates for Γ, it is easy to see that, for any t > 0, the distribution of
(a similar argument was used in the proof of Lemma 2). Due to periodicity of the coefficients, we deduce that χ x satisfies (23) in the same sense asχ x .
Repeating the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain, as ∆Q → 0:
for every x ∈ (0, 1). Thus, using the dominated convergence theorem, we conclude:
The following proposition describes the asymptotic behavior of ∂ Q I for large Q. Proof: Using Ito's formula, it is easy to see that u(t, y) = 1 0 χ x t (y)ψ(x)dx is a weak solution to
Recalling that χ x satisfies (23) along (0, ∞) × {1 − }), we deduce that v(t, y) := u(t, y) − 1 0 χ x t (1 − )ψ(x)dx satisfies (25) with the same initial and with zero boundary conditions. Applying Theorem III.2.1 in [16] to v, we conclude that ∂ y v(t, ·) = ∂ y u(t, ·) L 2 is bounded uniformly over t ≥ 0. This, in turn, yields uniform continuity of the family {u(t, ·)} t≥0 . Since the weak limit of this family, as t → ∞ is χ (see Lemma 2), we conclude that it is also a strong limit in the uniform norm. This, along with (24), completes the proof of the proposition.
Thus, we have shown that the marginal expected impact on the midprice at the beginning of an execution sequence is proportional to the stationary distribution ofX mod 1 at 1 − . Similarly, we have shown that the marginal expected impact at the end of a sufficiently long execution sequence is proportional to the stationary distribution ofŶ mod 1 at 1 − . In the next section, we show that, for small θ > 0, the former exceeds the latter, which proves the asymptotic concavity of the expected impact curve.
Asymptotic concavity of price impact
In this section, we show that, for small θ, ψ(1 − ) > χ(1 − ). First, we recall the ODEs (19) and (20) and, multiplying them by θ, we deduce the existence and uniqueness of function (θ,
wherē
and we used β + (y) = 1 − y, β − (y) = −y, y ∈ (0, 1).
It is clear that ψ = f (0, ·)/σ 2 and χ = f (θ, ·)/σ 2 . Our goal is to show that, for small enough θ > 0, we have f (θ, 1) < f (0, 1). The next proposition establishes the desired result, but under two additional technical assumptions.
Assumption 1. There exists a constant ρ ≥ 1, s.t.
Note that all standing assumptions on σ are implied by the above assumption and the properties of F . 
Proof:
It is easy to see (e.g., using Feynman-Kac formula) that f (θ, x) is continuously differentiable in θ. Then, we differentiate (26) and (27) w.r.t. θ to obtain
for g(θ, x) := ∂ θ f (θ, x). Next, we consider the case θ = 0. The PDE (26) and the property ∂ x f (0, 1/2) =μ 0 (1/2) = 0 (which follows from the fact that f (0, ·) is symmetric around x = 1/2) yield:
The right hand side of the above is clearly non-positive for x ∈ (0, 1/2). For x ∈ (1/2, 1) its negativity is implied by the monotonicity of F on R − and by the log-concavity of F :
Recall the ODE for g(0, ·): (0, ·) ), g(0, 0) = g(0, 1).
The rest of the proof follows from the maximum principle. Indeed, the ODE in (30) and the conditions ∂ x (μ 1 f (0, ·)) < 0,μ 0 > 0 imply that g(0, ·) cannot have a strictly negative minimum in (0, 1) (otherwise, the ODE cannot be satisfied at the minimum point of g(0, ·)). Then, if g(0, 1) ≥ 0, we conclude that g(0, ·) ≥ 0, which contradicts (29) (the case g(0, ·) ≡ 0 is easily excluded, sinceμ 1 f (0, ·) cannot be constant). Thus, we conclude that g(0, 1) < 0 and complete the proof of the proposition.
Thus, we have proved the main mathematical result of this paper. Then, all assumptions made in Section 2 are satisfied and, for x ∈ [0, 1],
The ODE (26) becomes
To find the general solution of this ODE, we solve:
The boundary conditions yield
Thus, we have
. Figure 1 describes the shape of the stationary density f (θ, ·), for various values of θ. We can see that, as predicted by the theoretical results (recall Proposition 5), the value of the density at the boundary decreases as θ increases. Moreover, we see that the stationary density becomes more skewed toward the left, as θ increases. The latter indicates that, during the execution of a meta-order, the fundamental price is more likely to be closer to the best bid than to the best ask price, which is consistent with the phenomenon of "improving liquidity" discussed in Section 1. Indeed, if we interpret the fundamental price as the microprice, the fact that it is closer to the best bid price means that the volume of limit orders at the best ask is higher than the volume at the best bid, which implies better liquidity for the executor (assuming that the total volume at the best bid and ask does not change on average).
Next, for a fixed participation rate θ ∈ (0, 1], we compute the expected price impact as a function of executed volume Q (i.e., the expected price trajectory). Recall the formula (22),
where, in the present case,Ŷ
The PDE for u Q,θ (t, x) := E Ŷ x Q−t is given by
We use the explicit Euler scheme to approximate u and compute the impact curve I(·, θ) by approximating numerically the integral
The result of this computation is shown in the left part of Figure 2 .
Finally, we address the question of price resilience, which measures the expected trajectory of the midprice after a meta-order has been executed. We assume that the execution of the meta-order lasted long enough, so that the process describing the conditional distribution of the fundamental price run on the business time of the executor,Ŷ , had entered into its stationary regime before the execution was over. Mathematically, the latter means that, after the execution, the fundamental price run on the business time of the market follows the processY
whereW is a Brownian motion, andμ
Hence, the price resilience is defined as
whereV represents the total traded volume in the market. The right part of Figure 2 shows R(V , θ) as a function ofV . Note that, since θ = 0.2, the range of values ofV , in the right part of Figure 2 , is chosen to match the range of values of Q, in the left part: indeed, the execution of a meta-order of size Q via a VWAP strategy with participation rate θ = 0.2 will terminate when the total traded volume becomesV = Q/θ = 5Q. It is clear from the right part of Figure 2 that the price resilience is convex and that the expected midprice does not decay to its initial level, which is consistent with the existing theoretical and empirical findings.
Testing the model predictions on market data
The heuristic argument described in Section 1 shows that the concavity of price impact can be derived from two predictions. The first prediction is that the stationary distribution of the fundamental price modulo tick size, run on the business time, is U-shaped. And the second prediction is that, during the execution of a metaorder, the fundamental price drifts in the direction of the order. Although one cannot test empirically the second assumption without having access to meta-orders, it does not seem that this assumptions requires any additional justification beyond common sense. Thus, this subsection tests the first assumption, using publicly available data without any information about the meta-orders themselves.
The experiment presented here uses data from NASDAQ exchange obtained via ITCH protocol, which provides information about every event in the limit order book. An event may be an execution, an addition, or a cancelation of a limit order. The associated prices and volumes are either specified directly or can be recovered from prior events. Using this data, one can reverse engineer the trade volumes and the volumes at the first few levels of the limit order book, at the time of every event. 11 The time interval we use covers November 3-7 of 2014 and includes the tickers CSCO, INTC, LBTYK, LVNTA, MSFT, VOD. We perform the analysis for each ticker separately.
Following the discussion presented in Section 1, we interpret the fundamental price modulo one, X mod 1, as the microprice: i.e.,
where V b and V a are the volumes at the best bid and ask respectively. We split the interval [0, 1] into 10 intervals J 1 , . . . , J 10 of length 0.1 and use the following approximation for the stationary density:
where {S i } represent all the events in the limit order book, for the given ticker and the given time interval, for which the bid-ask spread, right before the event, does not exceed two ticks (this restriction is discussed further in this subsection), and |∆V Si | denotes the size of the trade at the event S i (equal to zero if no trade occurred at this event). The volumes V b/a Si are recorded right before the event S i . The motivation for such approximation of f (0, ·) comes from the assumption of ergodicity ofX mod 1 (see Lemma 2) .
The estimated stationary density f (0, ·) is presented in Figures 3-5 , for each ticker in our sample. It is clear that the U-shape property holds for most of the tickers in the sample except LBTYK and LVNTA. There are two possible reasons why the U-shape prediction fails for the latter two tickers. The first, and most straightforward, explanation is the relatively small traded volume of the two stocks. Indeed, the first row of Table 1 shows the total traded volume, in the number of shares, of each ticker over the sample time period, and it indicates that the traded volumes of LBTYK and LVNTA are below the traded volumes of other tickers. However, the volume of LBTYK is very close to that of VOD, and the latter ticker has U-shaped stationary density. This observation motivates the need for a second explanation. As shown in the second row of Table 1 , the fraction of order book events at which LBTYK and LVNTA have small (1 or 2 ticks) spreads is significantly lower that that of the other tickers. And it is clear that, for a small-tick stock, whose spread varies across many multiples of the tick size, the proposed model may not be a good description of the dynamics of the fundamental price. Indeed, as the spread size is known to be strongly mean-reverting, the drift and volatility of the fundamental price must, at the very least, depend on the value of the spread itself. In addition, the best bid and ask prices can no longer be assumed to be the roundings of the fundamental price, if the spread varies significantly. The failure of these assumptions is the reason why only the trades occurring at small spreads are included in the computation (31). 
